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Abstract—In this article, the focus is on the different kind of 
software solutions, how can a microcontroller increase the 
fault-tolerance level of the embedded system. At the 
beginning, it will be shown, the theoretical base connection 
between fault, error and failure, the possible causes of 
faults, fault tolerant solutions and fault tolerant software 
solutions. In the realization part, it will be shown, how the 
error-free running time and error detecting features can be 
increase the robustness of the system. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fault-masking architectures can be classified into 
mainly hardware or software categories. Of course, neither 
can stand alone. It is containing mainly the type of the 
solution, which is in its name. The duplication of 
frequently failing units (typically, power supply unit [1]) 
is the most common way to realize a hardware redundancy 
[2]. In software solutions, there are the multiple execution, 
the multiple measurements [3] and the majority voters as 
the most common major categories. 
From the foregoing, it seems, depending to what kind 
of redundancy had been used, it has significantly impact 
to system performance, required power, weight, price and 
reliability. It is important to review the various methods to 
assess – the perspective of – the possibilities how to 
increase the reliability. 
But first, let us declare the exact meanings the three 
basic concepts, fault, error and failure. These concepts are 
connected through causes and effects. The fault causes an 
error, which is causes failure. 
A. Fault, error and failure 
The fault is the errors proven or suspected cause. In 
case of a hardware component it could be short circuit, 
connection cut or parameter changes listed here, while in 
software case, it could be unexpected input combination, 
staying in an endless loop, make an addressing mistake, to 
mentioning only a few. An example, during 
manufacturing an AND gate, and the surface of the 
semiconductor had been polluted by a micro-sized dust 
particle, the AND gate’s input may stay in high logic 
level.  
The error – caused by the fault – is already appears the 
internal state of the device. [4] For example, if the AND 
gate’s input gets a high logic level input voltage, the input 
signal is the same as the stacked leg’s signal. If the input 
signal changing – gets a low logic level – the change is no 
longer transmitted through the input drive, and the AND 
gate’s output will not change. That will cause an error in 
the system.  
A failure occurs, when the error gets out of the system’s 
output. The gate’s output did not enforce in the logical 
function, so it affected for the system’s output signals. 
Thereby, the error gets out to the outside world and 
become a failure. [5]. 
The three mentioned type of errors, appears in three 
different level (Fig. 1.). The fault is inherently physical, 
the error is modifying the internal state of the system, it’s 
informational nature, and failure essentially affect to the 
outside world. 
B. Causes of faults 
The developing process of a device is starting with the 
specification phase. If this is not successful, that will 
cause a failure conception.  
The formation of errors can be traced back to several 
things, like external interference or the consequences of 
the mistakes made during the design of the system or a 
component. The fault will not come to the surface, even 
during the examination of the final conformity test of the 
finished product. The error only turns out during the 
installation, operation and appears as a failure. 
The topic of specification mistakes includes for 
example not correct timing, conversion, leveling, etc. 
between hardware or software modules. 
The implementation mistakes may occurs when 
specification is implemented into practice. Improper or 
wrong component selection, not correct planning 
decisions or mistakes in coding may be the root cause. 
The component imperfection is the most common 
source of fault. None of the components – neither from the 
same type – are matching perfectly, because their 
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Figure 2. Preventing the spread of errors 
parameters will may vary slightly. This can be easily 
remedied with conscious design or with component 
selection, however, the problems related to random 
component failures are much more significant. Typical 
causes are, for example, in case of microelectronic 
components, – within the case – the rupture of the bonds; 
metal corrosion; in case of electronic PCB’s, some 
manufacturing imperfections or changes in the operating 
conditions – operating in extreme conditions. The failure 
type of component imperfection is also including the 
failure due to aging of the parts.  
Strong emphasis should be placed on the control of 
external interferences. The foreseeing planning can give 
the ability to control these unpredictable effects. It can be 
classified into external interferences for example, the 
electromagnetic interference, radiation, the mistake of the 
operator, the result of a physical injury or environmental 
extremity (vibration, temperature, dust, humidity, …), etc. 
C. Nature of faults 
If it could understand better the root causes of faults, 
then it could be developed improved procedures to 
prevent their formation. But until this, it need to be 
intervened after the appearance of an error, to maintain the 
operation of the system. [6] 
As a first step, it is needed to know the types of faults: 
• Source of faults: 
o Specification mistakes 
o Implementation mistakes 
o External interference 
o Component imperfection 
• Type of faults: 
o Software 
o Hardware 
▪ Analog 
▪ Digital 
• Duration of fault: 
o Permanent 
o Sporadic 
o Transient 
• Expense of fault: 
o Local 
o Global 
• Value of the fault: 
o Determined 
o Not determined 
Very many fault combinations can be imagined based 
on the upper – broadly – classification. It is not expected 
to give a proper global solution for the problems. As a 
result, many theories have been advanced for the 
treatment of certain causes of errors.  
The discussion of these is beyond the scope of the 
article, but it will be appreciated that, it needs to correct 
the relevant faults. After the exploration of the fault 
possibilities, it need to analyze the probability of the fault, 
and its consequences, and the resources spent for the 
troubleshooting. 
It is practical – if the conditions allowing it – to choose 
the minimal hardware-intensive solutions, and prefer the 
software solutions, especially in embedded systems. 
D. Propagation of faults 
Fault tolerance, fault avoidance, fault prevention and 
fault masking is also a constructive technic, which can 
increase the reliability of the devices. Fig. 2. shows the 
application areas of the mentioned techniques. 
Fault avoidance, fault prevention is the first defense line 
to prevent the formation of faults. Several techniques can 
be used, to increase the quality of the used components 
and the applied technologies. The method is characterized 
in that the disorder can be treated even before the 
formation. For example: plan criticism by an outside 
expert, using design practices to increasing reliability, 
component selection, oversizing, testing, shielding, and 
other methods to improve quality. 
The fault masking techniques are about to protect the 
system from the evolution of faults become an error. [7] 
When the fault has already occurred, fault masking is try 
to eliminate the fault’s effect from the system – it does not 
let the fault to step out from the physical universe. A 
typical solution for a fault-masking system, is based on 
majority voting, where several autonomous decisions are  
made, and the result is given by the majority of voters. In 
this example, if one of the participants generates incorrect 
outcome, it becomes filter out, for this, it just need to be 
compared with the results of the other participants. Thus, 
the fault does not cause an error in the results. 
The purpose of fault tolerance is to avoid faults, if the 
fault evolved an error. In this case fault masking and/or 
reconfiguration can be used. It can detect the error, then 
find out the source of it and the defective item will be 
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Figure 3. Triple modular redundancy 
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Figure 4. Sequential triple modular redundancy 
removed from the system and might set into operation a 
new one. [8] 
II. FAULT-TOLERANT SOLUTIONS 
At the beginning of the fault tolerance history, the 
usage of redundancy is always limited to physical 
hardware solutions. The most common solution to realize 
fault tolerance was to multiply the physical parts of the 
device, but nowadays we have more sophisticated 
solutions [9]. A redundant system – compared to simple 
system – have added information, resources or time.  
The following types of redundancies are available: 
• Hardware redundancy is when extra hardware is 
added to the system, it is typically used for fault 
detection and for fault tolerance. For example, 
multiplication of modules.  
• Software redundancy means that, the added extra 
software modules, giving the possibilities to 
detect the faults – if possible, fix them –, next to 
the default functions of the original software. For 
example, timeout monitoring assigned to 
waiting’s. 
• Information redundancy is the extra information 
what is used to fault detection - if possible, fault 
correction – which would not be necessary for the 
default functions of the device. For example, 
using error correcting bits. 
• Time redundancy is the extra time what is used to 
fault detection and fault tolerance features. For 
example, running identical calculations multiple 
times and checking the consistency of the 
outcome. 
Whichever type of redundancy is had been used, the 
costs will rise. When choosing hardware redundancy extra 
parts are required, also the power needs, the size of the 
device, and the cost of the development will increase 
parallel [10]. If we using software redundancy, it also has 
some effect to hardware redundancy, because we need 
stronger processor and bigger memory capacity, more 
time in developing phase, and so on. [11] 
III. SOFTWARE REDUNDANCY 
Reliability can be increased by increasing the number 
of the software segments. It need to be compare – with the 
proper algorithm – these redundant software segments, 
and calculate/chose the right result as a local output. This 
result will be one of the input parameter of the next 
software module. [12] 
A. Majority voters 
Majority voters need to have at least three different 
inputs. If two of the inputs are working properly, the voter 
will give a correct result. So, the method can tolerate only 
one malfunction. If more than one of the inputs gets a 
false signal, the output of the majority voter will be 
incorrect (see at Fig. 3.). 
In software, there could run three different software 
method in parallel. The results of these software methods 
need to be compared by the majority voter. [13] 
Majority voters are simple modules both is software 
and hardware realization. Therefore, it has a fairly high 
reliability compared with the other system modules. But, 
if the voter gets out of order – single point of failure – the 
whole systems operation becomes impossible. A solution 
could be, if the voters are tripled, as showed in Fig. 4. By 
converting functions as a sequence of sequential steps, and 
by incorporating voters between each level, the reliability 
of the system can be increased significantly [14]. This 
way it is possible to stop the error near to the appearance 
of the error, so it will not spread out to the other parts of 
the system. Thanks to this, the system can tolerate 
multiple errors if, they are appearing in different levels. 
B. Software solutions 
The advantage of the software solution – compared to 
the hardware solution – is the flexibility, less parts 
demand (against with a 32-bit long hardware voter), 
resulting in lower consumption and cost. Although, the 
algorithm requires only a small computing capacity, but it 
is slower than the dedicated hardware, and in addition, in 
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Figure 5. Mean value voter 
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Figure 8. Flowchart of multiple majority voters 
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Figure 5. Technological voter 
the case of independent systems, synchronization 
problems need to be solved. [15] 
C. Redundant measurements 
However, many times (such as outputs of sensors), the 
values are correct, but they are not exactly the same, they 
differ within their accuracy. In a software solution makes 
it easy to produce the correct output. [16] A delta 
deviation is allowed for the measured values. If the 
measured values are within the delta range (relative to 
each other), it does not count as an error. But, in the case 
of multiple parallel voters, it is necessary to ensure that 
each of the voting outputs is exactly the same (bits are 
exactly the same).  
If delta tolerance is selected according to the powers of 
two, then this method can be used for both hardware and 
software voters if the LSB bits are omitted from the 
comparison – with masking or shifting right the measured 
values. [17] 
Mean value voter gives a different solution for the 
above-mentioned problem. It is providing the best result 
for multiple – even with significantly different – inputs. 
[18] As shown in Figure 5., the voter is selecting the 
middle value. As long as, two signs out of three are 
correct, the voter always choose the correct signal. The 
principle can be applied to any voter with an odd number 
of inputs. 
In some cases, it makes sense to determine the output 
value as a function of the input values. For example, if not 
the middle value had been chosen – like in the mean value 
voter – but calculates the currently expected output signal 
based on the values of the inputs recorded at previous 
times. [19] 
IV. REALIZATION 
If we use only one actuator, we cannot duplicate the 
voters. Therefore, if possible and the nature of the process 
permits, several interveners and a sufficient number of 
voters should be used. 
In our solution three digital temperature sensors output 
values are used as the input signals of the system, three 
voters had been applied, and three fan used as actuators. It 
is shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. Fig. 8. shows the flowchart 
of the demonstration project. 
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Figure 6. Operating plan of the multiple majority voter 
 
 
Figure 7. Realization of the multiple majority voter 
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Figure 9. Technological voter 
Another solution – to show a robust solution – is if the 
voting circuit had been left, and the interconnected system 
of several interveners are used, which also performs the 
voting task, in addition to the process control. This is 
called as a technology voter (Fig. 9). The voting takes 
place by serial parallel coupling of six FET’s. Technology 
voting does not only have the advantages of increasing 
reliability due to the lack of a voting circuit, but it can also 
be used to replicate the interveners and to deal with errors 
in them. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, is showed the theoretical base connection 
between fault, error and failure, the possible causes of 
faults, fault tolerant solutions and fault tolerant software 
solutions. In a realization, it had been shown, a redundant 
software block based system, with a reliable measurement 
algorithm. By the mentioned solutions, the error-free 
running time and error detecting features can be increased, 
as showed in the implementation of the system. We 
believe that the presented methods can be used in several 
applications. 
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